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Military historian Jeremy Black's wide-ranging objective for his book, War: Past, 
Present and Future, is to make plain the Eurocentric, pro-Western assumptions that 
characterize both military history and policy-making. These assumptions are evident in 
analytical biases toward technological determinism and inter-state, rather than intra-state, 
conflict. War, in total, is meant to expand analysis beyond realism's stress on 
international material factors alone by considering organizational and cultural 
determinants that also, for Black, affect warfare and change. 
In order to redirect attention toward "less advanced" practices and peoples dating from 
the fifteenth century to the present, War's strategy is twofold. First, through analysis of 
interactions between Westerners and other groups, War contends that Western military 
successes are frequently overplayed and those of others have been downplayed or at least 
not readily recognized. As well, though Europeans eventually dominated other parts of 
the world through their social, economic, and military practices, for Black this had less to 
do with military technological superiority than it did with the cultural and institutional 
impetuses driving imperialism. Moreover, the acceptance of these practices was uneven 
and subject to a society's own particular socio-political dynamics. From this perspective, 
Black can assert that while many militaries today look the same from the outside, their 
raison d'être may not be directed solely (or even) toward warwinning, but rather toward 
objectives within a society both informal, such as social mobility, and instrumental, such 
as policing. 
Second, War identifies examples of the limitations of Western military activity largely in 
isolation from interactions with "the other." The (limited) merits of technological 
development in the early modern period are discussed as is the current Western 
obsession, especially for the United States, with the Revolution of Military Affairs 
(RMA). On this latter point, Black argues that while the RMA is demonstrative of 
American technological advances, it is also a function of American culture. The RMA 
can be viewed as part of the American cultural affinity to promote technological prowess 
and to employ overwhelming force while at the same time trying to minimize risk. Even 
though the book was published before the quick triumph of the American coalition over 
Iraqi forces in 2003 and the subsequent difficulties the occupiers faced, quoting an 
extended passage of the text is appropriate and carries an ominous ring: 
. . . there is a danger that the RMA serves as an apparent substitute for a political 
willingness to commit troops, and also as a cover for the failure, first, to develop effective 
counterinsurgency doctrine and practice, second, to conceive of a strategy for successful 
long-term expeditionary operations, and third, to work within the difficult context of 
alliance policy-making and strategic control. (p. 286) 
A valuable lesson from War is that technology, and a belief in the merits of technology, 
may help to win conflicts in the Western mindset, but they are of limited utility, and may 
even prevent political and military leaders from understanding how to win the peace on 
the ground. 
While Black has set the bar high, given the scope of his analysis, there are ways he might 
have cleared it much more easily. Despite its goal of revealing the nature of non-Western 
war, the book's consideration of warfare in isolation from European actors is minimal. 
Examples of conflicts of this type from earlier times are only dealt with in a cursory 
manner. Similarly, in contemporary times, analysis of intra-state conflict in the 
developing world/weak state context is also fleeting. Yet, there are many compelling 
examples, some such as the conflicts in Western Africa and the Great Lakes Region, 
which even go beyond the common civil war characteristics of succession or seizing state 
control and possess elements of warlordism as well. Hence, it is odd that notwithstanding 
the possibilities for investigation and Black's own lament that military historians have 
largely ignored intra-state conflicts, War examines in-depth only the English and 
American Civil Wars, the two intra-state cases that have been largely examined 
elsewhere and are Western in nature. 
In sum, while a different selection of evidence would have strengthened its arguments, 
War is nevertheless an important contribution to warfare studies. Put differently, though 
the choice of answers might have been more convincing, the book asks the right 
questions needed to reveal how the Western way of war and the purpose for the military 
have come to dominate intellectual and policy pursuits at the expense of understanding 
the merits and differences of other traditions and approaches. 
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